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GIDEON v. WAINWRIGHT
V. Gideon v. Wainwright's Application in the Courts Today
Paula Semmes Deutsch
Susan Hofkin Salomon
Barbara D. Underwood
Charles Ogletree
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein
Hon. Michael R. Juviler
A. Gideon's Effect on a Legal Aid Trial Attorney245
We have talked today about the ideals of Gideon. We have
talked about ideals such as the fourth and fifth amendments.
These are the reasons that we, as Legal Aid lawyers, are here.
But what is the daily grind of being a Legal Aid attorney really
like? I would like to address that topic.
When you become a Legal Aid lawyer, you think that you
are going to be the champion of poor people who are dying to
meet you, who are thrilled with your representation, who are in-
nocent victims of society, who are indigent. And then, slowly,
these ideals get chipped away.
The first thing you notice is that not everyone is innocent.
When you start at Legal Aid you develop a big caseload and, yet,
you soon realize that in this city of eight million people in the
naked city, there are only three stories. People find guns and
gold jewelry in garbage cans. Guns are found everywhere. They
are under cars, in trash cans, and even under doormats. Women
who are allegedly raped, in reality, are giving sex for crack.
These are the types of stories that you hear in each and every
case. Slowly you begin to realize that maybe this prosecutor is
not railroading every client, and that maybe, in some cases, your
client is guilty.
As you gain experience as a Legal Aid lawyer, you represent
clients with cases which are more serious, more violent; clients
who have long and violent records. Gideon apparently was a
fifty-two year old man who was used up beyond his years. He
was only a con artist as far as I understand. Well, how about the
245. This section of the conference was presented by Paula Semmes Deutsch -
Senior Trial Attorney, The Legal Aid Society, Criminal Defense Division; J.D., Brooklyn
Law School, 1975; Recipient of 1987 Orison S. Marden Award.
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guy who was caught extracting a chicken fork from the belly of
his six month pregnant wife? What about the guy you're repre-
senting who raped fourteen women, anally, orally, and vaginally
over a several hour period? Or the guy who's got ten burglaries,
who left his fingerprints everywhere, whose M.O. is to smother
his victim, one of whom had a heart attack as a result. Or the
guy who took a young Orthodox Jewish girl, a virgin, across the
river in her own car and raped her repeatedly? How do you feel
representing these guys? Gideon was a piece of cake next to
them.
Not only as a Legal Aid lawyer do you fight with District
Attorneys, who want to hide evidence, who do not want to listen
to your impassioned pleas, and with judges who are interested
only in moving cases quickly, half the time you are also fighting
with your own clients. You get up early so that you can meet
your investigator at 7 a.m. You go out there and speak to all the
witnesses so as to learn what that case is really about. You come
back with the information and talk to your client. What is his
reaction? Your client is hostile and angry at you, funneling all of
the frustrations which he feels about the "system," about being
incarcerated in a disgusting environment, at you, the one person
who is trying to help him.
One person, a young man named Billy, became my client
when the attorney previously assigned to him left due to burn
out. Billy called several times a day with the same refrain, "I
want to get out; I want to get out." He would not listen to my
analysis of the case and when I would ask him pertinent ques-
tions such as 'How do we explain that you were caught in flight
by an eye witness, identified by the complainant, and found with
her jewelry in your pocket?", his answer was always the same, "I
want to go home." I began to pay extra attention to Billy be-
cause I felt he was unable to cope with making a well thought-
out decision as to his case.
One day I went upstairs to the ninth floor pens in Brooklyn.
The ninth floor has a really charming interview room - there is
a toilet in it that is always half filled with either food or feces. It
smells but I thought that I was going to sit there at a table
across from the client like a human being. Well, I don't know of
any human being that can sit in that kind of atmosphere and
like it. I asked the officer to get my client Billy, and of course
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Billy did what he always does when I interview him: he cursed
me out. I had it that day. I was short on patience. I said, "Okay,
Billy this is it. The interview is over," and I asked the officer to
take him out and get me another client whose name is Mr.
Slaughter.
Mr. Slaughter was on lifetime parole for murder. Right now
he is on trial in Staten Island for attempted murder, and after
he finishes that trial, I am going to defend him against an armed
robbery charge. Fortunately for Mr. Slaughter, the victim of the
armed robbery just got arrested for selling drugs from his house.
It was really wonderful. It dropped into our laps and we can
weave it into the defense.
Sometimes you really have to take a lesson from people in
your life as a Legal Aid lawyer. Mr. Slaughter came in immedi-
ately after Billy left. After I spoke to him about his case, he said,
"Well, what's happening with Billy?" I said, "Gee, I don't know.
I really don't. I'm really upset about him. He seems to be deteri-
orating in here." Mr. Slaughter said, "You know, the officer
came up and told us to come downstairs for calendar calls and
Billy wouldn't go. And I said, 'Come on, Billy, we got to go
down.' And the officer said, 'Are you codefendants?' Billy went
nuts. He said, 'I was arrested alone. He isn't my codefendant.'"
Mr. Slaughter said, "I am really worried, something is happen-
ing with him."
I thought if Mr. Slaughter, who has been accused of at-
tempted murder, who is on lifetime parole for murder, can have
patience with somebody, maybe I can have an extra ounce. So I
had the officer bring Billy back again. I sat him down and I said
to him, "What's happening with your family? Is your family vis-
iting you?" "No." "Have you had any visits since you were in-
carcerated a year ago?" He said, "No." I said, "Is that part of
what's upsetting you?" He said, "Yes, I can't stand being here."
He had calmed down at that point. Sometimes you have to take
a lesson from your client or whomever will give you the lesson.
As Mr. Slaughter was walking away, he turned around and
smiled at me. I said, "Thanks. I appreciate your thought and I
have learned from you."
There are also other things that occur as you come of age as
a Legal Aid lawyer. Most Legal Aid lawyers initially believe that
they are nobly representing the poor, the underprivileged, the
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indigent, and the minorities of our society. It is true that most
clients are Blacks - but so are their victims. Their victims
aren't middle class or wealthy Black people. Their victims are
poor people from the very same neighborhood, who may have a
gold chain or a little change in their pocket or something that
your client snagged. So how do you reconcile all that? You think
you're representing someone who wants to be a little better look-
ing by having nicer clothes or a status symbol, but he is ripping
off other people in his neighborhood. That is not so nice.
After a while, it really begins to hurt. The people you are
representing lie to you; they have done horrible things to other
poor people in their own neighborhood and they frequently take
out their frustrations on you. Just as you, yourself are feeling
blue about what is happening, you realize that society at large is
not to happy about what you're doing either. When I go to a
cocktail party and someone says, "What do you do?" I reply "I
am a lawyer." I hope that they don't ask me where I work." But
inevitably they do and then they say, "How can you represent
those people?" I have heard that question a million times as a
Legal Aid attorney. Sometimes what really angers me is that I
am feeling the same way myself especially when I am represent-
ing someone during trial who has committed a violent crime,
who is cursing at me and making motions to relieve me as his
counsel.
So why do we continue to do what we do as Legal Aid
attorneys.
Sometimes a case, a client comes along that makes you for-
get all the other frustrations and makes you know why you have
chosen to be a Legal Aid attorney. I am representing a fifteen
year old boy now. His name is Rene and he was never in trouble
with the law before. His own father was murdered during the
robbery of the bodega where he works. He lives with his mother,
a stepfather who is disabled due to mental illness, and his two
siblings. The family is on welfare. Rene had been a behavior
problem in school until the year prior to the incident for which
he was arrested. He was placed in special class and with the help
of teachers and guidance Counselors who took an interest in
him, he became "Student of the Year."
One day he was walking home from the Community Center
with three of his friends. They were joking around. Rene ran up
[Vol. 10:327
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on the porch of a house, put a match to a piece of paper that
was hanging in a broken window. The fire engaged pieces of
plastic and material that were hanging behind the paper, the
building "went up" in a flash and four people died.
Rene woke up to a nightmare-fifteen years old, never in
trouble finding himself charged with numerous counts of Arson
and Murder. Because of Legal Aid, Rene was able to get the le-
gal, investigative and forensic services he needed. Eventually,
the case was tried. Rene was acquitted on those counts which
would've required his being sentenced in Supreme Court and his
case was removed to Family Court. I was "paid off" for all of the
hard work and all of the frustrations involved when, at the end
of the case, Rene said to me, "Thank you, Paula, another lawyer
wouldn't have worked so hard for me." Better than a bonus
check.
So despite all the problems and frustrations, some times
you feel good about being a Legal Aid attorney because of the
Renes you represent and also because of the ideals you have and
your beliefs that the constitution extends to everyone no matter
how heinous is the crime of which they're accused. When you
step into a courtroom to champion these rights of the accused,
you know that you're championing the rights of everyone in
Society.
B. Gideon's Effect On Legal Aid Appellate Attorneys24
Anthony Lewis spoke about the romance of Gideon. I think
when I started with the Appeals Bureau, and that's where I
started out in 1973, there was definitely a very romantic notion
about Gideon. The sixties were still very much alive there. They
are not alive anymore, but we still have an excellent Appeals
Bureau. We have computer systems. We get the work out and
the reversal rate, under the circumstances, is probably as good
as could be expected. We have all the systems in place. We have
brief banks. We have very knowledgeable attorneys.
Why is the practice difficult? I think over the years, I have
246. This section of the conference was presented by Susan Hofkin Salo-
mon-Assistant Attorney in Charge, Criminal Appeals Bureau, The Legal Aid Society;
Adjunct Instructor in Law in Professional Responsibility, Columbia University Law
School; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School, 1970.
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increasingly spent more and more time counselling our lawyers
in their relations with their clients. We usually do not see our
client face-to-face, so we do not have the opportunities for these
wonderful personal interchanges that Paula has been speaking
to you about. But we do communicate with them through the
mail. We spend much of our time trying to calm down clients
who want to tell us things that happened at their trial that were
not reflected in the minutes, and sometimes we have to go and
chase these things down. We have a burgeoning collateral attack
process going on in the Bureau. We have clients who want to
raise issues and we have to discuss these issues with them.
The Supreme Court decided Jones v. Barnes24 7 a few years
ago. In Jones the Court held it did not constitute ineffective as-
sistance of counsel for an appellate lawyer to choose the issues
to raise in a case, even when omitting some arguably colorable
issues was contrary to the wishes of his client. 4 8 There were dis-
senting and concurring opinions in the case that cited ethical
provisions.249 I am very mindful of those ethical provisions. So
are the lawyers in our office. There are also moral considerations
and there are client-relation considerations.
It is a fiction, however, that through writing back and forth
with people, who very often have not gone to school, we can in-
telligently discuss matters with them. We try. We have to do it.
We also have to explain to these clients why we do not believe
that the issues that they want to raise have merit, or why the
issues might be harmful to their case. All of this takes time and
with all of this there is still the fact that if the client only had
money, he could vote with his feet and go to some other lawyer
who would include all of these issues.
We have, however, the pull of getting the work out. We have
the pull of wanting to keep the brief short. We have the pull
every once in a while of antipathy when we think, "wait a min-
ute, I am the lawyer in this case; the client is not." It is a little
different in degree from the kind Paula was talking about, but it
247. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
248. Id. at 754.
249. Id. at 754 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 755 (Brennan, J., dissenting);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7, 7-8 (1982), MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1982).
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exists. So there is that pull, that constant exchange of letters
and explanations of risks in cases which are very complicated.
Try explaining these unbelievably complicated concepts to your
friends. See if they understand that if they appeal a conviction
and they win, they might go back on a retrial and get a higher
sentence because a predicate felony determination may be re-
opened because collateral estoppel is not settled in this area. 50
This was a letter that I helped one of our new attorneys draft for
a client. It is a fiction to believe that somebody is going to un-
derstand that without constant attention, without personal vis-
its, which we cannot make in all of our cases because we do not
have the funds. But precisely this fiction is indulged in every
day. I personally feel that just the simple gesture of making per-
sonal visits to our clients would make a difference even if we had
nothing to say. At least, they would know that there was an ac-
tual person there representing them, somebody with whom they
could talk.
I think the clients as much as anybody may be aware of the
change in circumstances; that maybe Gideon is no longer the ro-
mantic notion it once was. I think they understand that sublimi-
nally. I for one, however, am glad we have the lawyers that we
have, and I hope we can educate the public that we need the
very best people to protect all of us.
C. The Role of Prosecutors and Trial Judges in Assuring That
Defendents Receive Effective Assistance of Counsel25
We are a long way from providing every defendant with ef-
fective assistance of counsel. Largely for lack of resources, many
defendants do not get the kind of vigorous thoughtful represen-
tation that Gideon demands, or that happily, The Legal Aid So-
ciety in this city, in my experience, routinely provides. Because
250. See generally United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 2022 (1988); United States v. Diaz, 778 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 57 (1988); United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1052 (1977); United States v. Fitzgerald, 545 F.2d 578 (7th Cir. 1976).
251. This section of the conference was presented by Barbara D. Underwood - Vis-
iting Professor of Law, New York University; J.D., Georgetown University, 1969; Law
Clerk, Chief Judge David Bazelon, D.C. Circuit, 1969-71; Law Clerk, Justice Thurgood
Marshall, 1971-72; Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 1972-84; Chief of Appeals and
Counsel for the District Attorney, King's County District Attorney's Office, 1982-89.
1990]
7
PACE LAW REVIEW
of lack of experience, time, investigative assistance, energy, or
competence, many defense counsel routinely fail to make argu-
ments, raise defenses, raise issues on appeal where the record
seems to demand it.
During the last seven or eight years, while doing appellate
prosecution work in the city, I have become familiar with cases
where Anders252 briefs were filed when there were clear issues
that should have been raised on appeal. I have seen cases where,
at trial, the defendant's attorney failed to cross-examine a wit-
ness on a clearly important contradictory prior statement. In an-
other case, the defense counsel failed to seek bail for a woman
charged with killing her newborn child, and when the prosecu-
tion inquired about what bail the defendant could make, defense
counsel replied that he didn't know, and that he didn't know
why anyone was asking because bail was inappropriate in this
case.
The question is what to do about this recurring problem.
One thing, of course, is to put more resources into funding both
institutional and private attorneys who are appointed for indi-
gent defendants. I would not for a minute want to minimize the
importance of this. I strongly favor more funding for these attor-
neys, as well as for the prosecutors and courts that need funds to
make the system work. But we have to find ways to deal with
problems that will occur before the Nirvana of adequate funding
arrives. There are a couple of things we can do in the meantime.
One is to allocate the resources we have to the most serious
or most difficult cases. I read recently - I hope it is true-that
Legal Aid is planning to seek authorization for appointment to
represent homicide defendants. It has been a mystery to me why
that has not happened before. Prosecutors put their best attor-
neys and their most extensive resources into those cases. You
don't have to believe that those prosecutors are wonderful, or
those resources are extensive to conclude that the defense bar
ought to be doing the same if there are to be fair trials in homi-
cide cases. In cases of indigent defendants it quite frequently
252. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). The Supreme Court held that ap-
pointed criminal appellate counsel may withdraw from the case only by filing a brief
indicating that there are no issues in the case that might arguably support the appeal.
Id. at 744.
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just is not so. I look to The Legal Aid Society to do something
about that. I hope you can.
The second thing we can to do in the meantime is to move
away from a strict adversary model that says, if you put two
competent gladiators in the ring, you can rely on the battle to
produce truth or at least justice. We have to rely on judges and
on prosecutors to intervene to prevent at least the most egre-
gious failures of defense counsel. We already do that to some
extent, but we are very ambivalent, as I suppose we have to be,
about how that should work.
When trial judges intervene to ask questions, they are criti-
cized for asking too many questions and for interfering too much
in the course of the trial. Likewise, when prosecutors raise ques-
tions with the court or with defense counsel about whether a
defense ought to be raised, or a document ought to be used dif-
ferently, they are criticized for interfering, or for asking the
court to interfere into the thought processes of defense counsel.
There are legitimate concerns raised when judges intervene
or when prosecutors seek to second guess a defense. When they
do so there is a real risk that they will undermine defense strat-
egy. But we all know that this is not always so. Therefore we
have rules that ask judges to intervene, but not too much; rules
that require prosecutors to do justice as well as being
adversaries.
We do not have a clear idea of how this can occur. I do not
know either. I know, however, that my office sometimes opposes
Anders briefs, and asks for lawyers to be appointed to raise
points that we think are important. In particular cases, we have
urged appellate lawyers or trial lawyers to investigate lines of
defense that they have not investigated.
These requests have sometimes met with a chilling re-
sponse. In one appeal, for instance, a defense attorney filed a
brief claiming that the conviction should be reversed because
the Court failed to hold a Wade hearing.253 In preparing to re-
253. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (postindictment lineup is a critical
stage at which defendant and his attorney should have been notified of an impending
lineup). Wade established the right of an accused to counsel at any stage of the prosecu-
tion, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate the
accused's right to a fair trial. Id. at 226-27.
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spond to that brief, we discovered that there was in fact a Wade
hearing; we called the defense attorney and suggested that he
might perhaps like to withdraw that point, review the minutes of
the hearing, and make whatever challenges he might like. He
said, in substance, "I filed my brief. I'm not writing anything
more in this case." That problem needs attack on more than one
front. There is a real danger that sometimes Gideon will only
mean that there was a warm body on the side of the defense. In
such a case, justice is not done. My point is that we have to
worry not only about the principle of law that Gideon repre-
sents, but also about what actually happens.
I am sorry there aren't more prosecutors and judges here
today to join in this celebration. I think that it matters a great
deal to everybody who has anything to do with the criminal jus-
tice system that there be counsel for indigent defendants and
that they be effective.
D. Assistance of Counsel-Is it Effective? 54
I am just amazed today by the quality and the character of
the people who came to the podium and who have committed
themselves to this work. It's amazing, and I think it's somber for
me because I think back to Gideon and I think back to the time
the decision was made and how important it was in my life. I
was eleven years old when this case was decided and, if I knew
as much then about law as I know now, perhaps my case would
have been solved more favorably. I was a juvenile delinquent,
and in fact, just about the time the Gideon case was decided, I
had the misfortune to be caught stealing a small item from a
department store in my hometown. I thought that the best way
to get out of that situation was to be my own lawyer. The first
thing I did was to deny that I had stolen anything. When they
asked me to show them my hands, I did and I dropped the item.
So that did not work. My second line of defense was to leap out
of the car once the police put me in it and run home so that they
would never find me. I got in the car and realized that there
254. This section of the conference was presented by Charles Ogletree-Visting Pro-
fessor, Harvard Law School; J.D., Harvard, 1978; Training Director, DC Public Defender
Service, 1982-83; Trial Chief, DC Public Defender Service, 1983-84; Deputy Director, DC
Public Defender Service, 1984-85.
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were no door handles on the back door. So that did not work
either. When I got home, my mother wasn't there but they told
her and she was on her way home. I then came up with my third
and fourth lines of defense. The third was to contact my Uncle
Jabb and persuade him that I had just cause and that this was
an error of my youth. I wanted him to offer a mitigating defense
on my behalf. Uncle Jabb in his usual way did not make a com-
mitment one way or the other. He felt that my defense was per-
suasive, but he would not represent me. My final line of defense
was simply to meet my mother face to face, admit my guilt, and
offer mitigation in terms of punishment but - with a little
cushion. The cushion was two or three pairs of pants and two or
three shirts to minimize the pain. I made my argument very elo-
quently. She listened patiently, asked me to undress, and then
asked me to take a switch from the tree. She called the switch
"the persuader." It would persuade me that I would not engage
in crime in the future. So I went out and cut a small limb from a
tree and she told me that was not persuasive enough. So I cut a
larger limb and finally she was convinced that the branch was
large enough to persuade me that crime would not pay. Cer-
tainly, I know today that I should have had a lawyer. I learned
from that experience, so I celebrate Gideon in another way.
I also celebrate Gideon because I can remember as a law
student reading cases like Powell v. Alabama"5 where black de-
fendants faced the death penalty without lawyers to represent
them. I remember Brown v. Mississippi,2 5e where a deputy told
the judge in court in response to an inquiry as to how severely a
defendant was whipped: "Not too much for a negro; not as much
as I would have done if it was left to me. '2 57 I can remember
cases, decided well before Gideon, that clearly tolerated these
injustices.258 So I celebrate it.
255. 287 U.S. 45 (1982).
256. 297 U.S. 278 (1935).
257. Id. at 284.
258. House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 46 (1944) (fact that petitioner pleaded guilty after
the denial of his request for time to consult with counsel, does not deprive him of his
constitutional right to counsel); see, e.g., Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (refusal
of state court to appoint counsel to represent indigent defendant at trial for robbery held
not a denial of due process); Coates v. Maryland, 180 Md. 502, 511-12, 25 A.2d 676, 679-
80 (1942) (where trial for robbery is fair and not a pretense or a sham, the non-appoint-
ment of counsel does not constitute a lack of due process of law).
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I celebrate it because I have seen the Court expand the
rights of defendants in other areas as well. Mr. Krash talked
about the important extension of Gideon to the rights of
juveniles. In Miranda,"9 the Court expanded Gideon by showing
intolerance for continual police abuse of defendants in extra-ju-
dicial proceedings. So there is something to celebrate.
However, I also see the betrayal of Gideon when I read the
Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Cronic.26 0 In
Cronic the Supreme Court said that a real estate lawyer with no
trial experience, who had twenty five days to prepare to try a
complicated case, provided a defendant with effective assistance
of counsel. The betrayal is also evident in the Supreme Court's
ruling in Strickland v. Washington.26  In Strickland the Court
held that a defendant received effective assistance of counsel de-
spite the fact that his attorney gave up and failed to vigorously
represent the defendant in a capital case. I felt Gideon had been
betrayed in those cases. I question Gideon in three different in-
stances: lack of effective assistance of counsel,20 2 inadequate de-
259. Miranda v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 436 (1966).
260. 466 U.S. 648 (1984). In Cronic, the Supreme Court rejected an inferential ap-
proach employed by the Tenth Circuit to determine the effectiveness of counsel. Id. at
667. The court of appeals found that the defendant, convicted of mail fraud charges in a
check-kiting scheme, was denied his sixth amendment right to effective counsel, based
not on specific errors by his lawyer but rather on circumstantial factors. Id. at 652-53.
These included: (1) short pretrial preparation time; (2) inexperience of counsel; (3) the
gravity of the charge; (4) the complexity of possible defenses; and (5) accessibility of
witnesses to counsel. Id. at 665-67. The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals
erred in inferring ineffectiveness based on these circumstances-whether weighed indi-
vidually or in totality-and reasoned that proof of specific errors by counsel were neces-
sary to support a finding of ineffectiveness. Id. at 666-67.
261. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland pleaded guilty in a Florida trial court to an
indictment that included three capital murder charges. Id. at 672. Due to numerous ag-
gravating factors and no mitigating circumstances, Strickland was sentenced to death on
all three murder charges. Id. at 674-75. He then sought collateral relief on the grounds of
ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 675-78.
The Court held that effective counsel can only be questioned when the representa-
tion has been so undermined that the trial cannot be relied on to produce a just result.
Id. at 677-78. In order to reverse a conviction, one must show such defective assistance of
counsel as to be prejudicial to a just and fair trial. Id. at 678. The standard for judging
counsel assistance is "reasonable effective assistance, considering all the circumstances."
Id. The Court concluded that counsel's conduct was not unreasonable, and even if it
were found to be, there would be insufficient prejudice to warrant setting aside his death
sentence. Id. at 698-701.
262. See generally Colloquium, Effective Assistance of Counsel For the Indigent
Criminal Defendant: Has the Promise Been Fulfilled?, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
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fense of the poor,263 and inadequate defense of death row in-
mates.2 " I question Gideon when I look at the difficult issues
facing law firms and public defenders. I question Gideon be-
cause I see public defenders in Chicago, where there is no train-
ing program for lawyers going to court, having to meet their cli-
ents on the same day they plead them guilty, lacking the
resources to investigate their cases. I read about cases in the
District of Columbia, and I was involved in one, and in San Di-
ego and states where public defenders who challenge the system
are terminated because they insist on quality representation for
every single client.266 When they do that, they lose their jobs. I
also read with great dismay the actions of law firms that are
called upon to represent the indigent and claim, very interest-
ingly, that they do not feel competent to represent someone in a
criminal case. Yet these firms file the most eloquent and the
most thoroughly documented briefs I have ever Seen to persuade
the court that lawyers should not be compelled to represent cli-
ents that are not of their choice because these lawyers lack com-
petence in criminal matters.
Gideon has achieved some positive results. First, the silent
voices, the millions of clients, most of them black and minority,
have come to understand the difference a lawyer can make. It is
an important achievement that people want a lawyer because
they know it makes a difference.
The second thing I think Gideon has achieved is very per-
sonal; it happened to me about my seventh year of practicing as
a public defender. I stood before a judge in a very serious case
and the judge threatened me with contempt of court and with
going to jail. For the first time in my life I felt prepared to go to
jail. I felt good that I had done something worthwhile and im-
portant, and I was prepared that day to go to jail to represent
this client because I thought the Constitution required me to do
that and that the judge was wrong.
1 (1986).
263. See generally McConville & Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New
York City, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 581 (1986-87).
264. See generally Tabak, supra note 149.
265. People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal. 3d 616, 629-33, 668 P.2d 769, 779-81, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 462, 472-74 (1983) (counsel removed for refusal to participate in trial in protest of
inadequate time to prepare).
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Gideon can achieve much more, however, if the three forces
in the courtroom decide to make it real. If one day, the judges
turn around and say: "Wait a minute, this client is not properly
represented in this case, and as a matter of justice, we can't go
forward." If one day, the prosecutor stands up and says: "Wait a
minute, I cannot conscientiously prosecute this person because
he is being denied quality representation and therefore this is
not a fair proceeding." And third, when a defense lawyer says: "I
can no longer tolerate being part of this system of injustice that
requires me to represent a client in a superficial and ineffective
way and to have my name and my reputation attached to a mis-
carriage of justice day in and day out." When the judges, the
prosecutors and defense lawyers stand up and say: "We will no
longer allow these silent voices to remain silent. We will become
voices for justice." I think then that Gideon would really be
achieved.
I would like to see in the future our ability to adopt what
Justice Black said in 1963 - that this noble ideal (of the right
to counsel) cannot be realized if the poor man charged with a
crime has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.2"'
It cannot, it never has been, and it never will be.
Through this session today I think we have taken an impor-
tant step forward in saying that Gideon will be achieved when
all of us make that choice and we are prepared to go to jail, if
necessary. We are prepared to give our lives, give our time, and
give our hearts to make sure that the most innocent, the most
underprivileged, unemployed, uneducated individual actually re-
ceives effective assistance of counsel. When he stands before the
court to face a sanction he will be represented not simply by a
defense lawyer, but by a system that ensures fairness, justice,
and equality.
Lawyers are not luxuries in a criminal case; they are necessi-
ties, and I hope that through this session we will understand
that fundamental and important right and that all of us will see
to it that Gideon in the future will be achieved in some measure.
266. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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E. The Right to Counsel in the Federal Courts17
When Gideon v. Wainwright2 s came down in March 1963,
Judge Gene Nickerson and I were respectively County Executive
and County Attorney in Nassau County. Despite the fact that
we knew the county's budget would have to be stretched to pay
for supplying attorneys at the public's expense in all criminal
cases, we were delighted. Any attorney at all familiar with our
pre-Gideon criminal justice system would have been embar-
rassed by the hypocrisy of a claim of equal justice because it was
so divergent from the reality of justice denied to those who
could not afford to pay a lawyer.
It was quite clear to me - I had taught criminal law at Co-
lumbia - that the old rule of Betts v. Brady26 9 resting on case-
by-case application of discretion and fairness would not do. A
bright line was required not only out of decent respect for the
sixth amendment, but because of institutional impera-
tives - budgets, personnel and routine procedures. The same
kind of pressures required a clean and all inclusive Miranda rule
that everyone could understand and apply. Constitutional rights
often depend upon bureaucratic forms such as the warnings in
various languages carried in the pockets of hundreds of
thousands of police.
How has Gideon fared? Better in some places than others.
My impression is that it works better than we could have
hoped for in my court. The Legal Aid Society has a devoted
corps of first-rate full-time lawyers. They are assigned to most
cases. When there are conflicts or other problems, the Criminal
Justice Act Panel works. Judge Leo Glasser supervises it quite
closely.
Pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act,270 attorneys are se-
lected from a special panel to represent financially eligible de-
267. This section of the conference was presented by the Hon. Jack B. Weinstein -
Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York; LL.B., Columbia
University, 1948; Professor of Law, Columbia University, 1952-67; Adjunct Professor, Co-
lumbia University, 1967 to present; Author of numerous articles for the bar association
and legal journals, coauthored casebooks on Evidence, Civil Procedure, and New York
Practice; Author, Weinstein's Evidence.
268. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
269. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
270. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988).
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fendants in various proceedings without cost. Habeas petitioners
are represented by attorneys from this panel.
Twice a year new applicants are screened and appointed to
the panel. Currently the panel is made up of some 120 able at-
torneys. Attorneys are on duty to take assignments for a specific
period. Compensation is as follows:
1) Hourly rates:
a) $60/hour for time before a court or magistrate.
b) $40/hour for time spent out of court.
2) Maximum amount:
a) felony cases - $3,500
b) misdemeanors - $1,000
c) all other matters, including habeas - $750
3) Waiving maximum amounts:
amounts in excess of the maximum amounts can be ob-
tained in complex cases if the court or magistrate certi-
fies that additional payment is necessary to provide fair
compensation and the chief judge of the circuit (or an-
other circuit judge by delegation) approves it. These
waiver provisions are liberally applied so that the ap-
proved fees can run into the tens of thousands of dollars
in complex cases.
4) If counsel needs any kind of expert assistance it will be
paid for.
The Second Circuit polices appeals and moves them along.
The district court also hurries cases under the Speedy Trial
Rules. Release on bail (except in drug cases) is the rule under
the Bail Reform Act.271 Speedy but fair justice tends to be avail-
able to all in our court.
My impression from handling habeas corpus cases attacking
state convictions is that the state system (particularly its 18-B272
component) does not work as well. Criminal appeals, for exam-
ple, are sometimes terribly delayed because of inadequate moni-
toring of appointed counsel.
Overall, my impression is that, though the Gideon battle
was won, the war for equal and effective justice is being lost.
On the civil counsel side we do poorly. I am chagrined about
271. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141-3143 (1966).
272. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1990).
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this. Twenty-five years ago, as first chairman of Nassau Legal
Services, I helped set up one of the first Office of Economic Op-
portunity legal delivery services with lawyers, social workers and
fairly adequate funding. These services are now under severe
pressure, partly because of the federal executive's unrelenting
hostility. Publicly-funded civil legal services are grossly inade-
quate. Only part of the slack is covered by our excellent eastern
district panel of volunteer attorneys and our Eastern District
Foundation which pays some of the expenses of the attorneys.
On the criminal counsel side, the technical defenses of at-
torneys are essential but almost irrelevant to solving our terrible
crime problems. The cry for more prisons, stiffer sentences and
capital punishment represents largely political election year clap
trap. Our society is breaking more and more into the haves and
a permanent underclass of have-nots. Resources, even in hospi-
tals, go less and less to those in need - a disproportionately
large number of whom are drug dealers and violent criminals.
The criminal justice system lacks the social services, the advice,
and the help that is needed by those caught up in its machinery.
The appointed lawyer is not a friend with a helping hand and
advice on how to avoid future trouble. He or she is all too often
an overworked technician without any real interest in the client
as a person.
What needs to be done? What can be done? What broaden-
ing of ethical obligations to client needs should be considered by
lawyers, by judges? What are our obligations to be advocates, in
the legislatures and the media, revealing the virtual bankruptcy
of our judicial system as a crime preventative agency? Can we,
as Lincoln asked, continue to be a house divided against itself -
so much in ignorance, poverty, despair and crime? What can be
done to stop this terrible descent from shining ideals to tar-
nished reality? What is the role of attorneys and judges post-
Gideon?
F. The Right to Counsel in New York Today2 73
Let me try to put you back in a mood of celebration by
turning back to the way things stood in New York when Clar-
273. This section of the conference was presented by the Hon. Michael R. Juviler -
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ence Gideon was being prosecuted and I was starting out as a
prosecutor, and end with my perspective of the last nine years as
a judge in a Criminal Term.
In 1963, murder was a capital offense in New York and de-
fendants would have been facing the following situation with re-
spect to the availability of counsel if they could not afford their
own lawyer: The statute said that someone charged with a capi-
tal offense was entitled to a lawyer, who was to be paid $1,500,
and if two lawyers were assigned, the total fee was $2,000.274 The
fee was the same whether or not the case went to trial and capi-
tal punishment was the potential punishment. As you can expect
in a situation like that, most murder cases ended in a plea of
guilty, and there was a built-in conflict of interest in the repre-
sentation right off the bat.
The judges in New York City who administered this law
were astute enough to realize, having read Powell v. Alabama,275
that they could not assign all of the lawyers in the county to a
defendant, but there was one judge in one celebrated case2 76 who
was very creative. He managed to assign eight different lawyers
in the one case. When the case came to trial, four of them were
still in it. Two of them reported sick, one of them was unac-
counted for, and one of them said that he was not ready to try
the case. So a new lawyer was assigned, and over the weekend,
he prepared this capital case and the next Monday started to
pick the jury. When the case got to the appellate division on a
life sentence, the appellate division signaled what was going to
happen to this kind of system in New York, much as the Su-
preme Court had signaled when it assigned Abe Fortas in
Gideon. The appellate division assigned Whitman Knapp to re-
present the defendant,2 77 and after argument sent the case back
Judge, New York State Court of Claims and currently Acting Supreme Court Justice,
New York Supreme Court. B.A., Swarthmore College, 1956; LL.B., Yale University
School of Law, 1960; Assistant District Attorney, New York County 1960-74; Chief of
Appeals, 1968-74; Counsel for New York State Office of Court Administration, 1974-79;
New York City Criminal Court Judge, 1979-86.
274. Pre-Gideon New York Law on appointment of counsel was explicitly granted
by N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
275. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
276. People v. Douglas, 19 A.D.2d 455, 244 N.Y.S.2d 55, (1st Dep't 1963).
277. See, e.g., People v. Lynch, 2 Misc.2d 217, 155 N.Y.S.2d 572, rev'd on other
grounds, 2 A.D.2d 854, 155 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1955); People v. Cunningham, 2 Misc.2d 164,
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for a new trial.
At that time, The Legal Aid Society was the main provider
of representation, and the quality of representation was excel-
lent. A new system of backup was created shortly before Gideon,
which is now known as the 18-B system."' In many cases send-
ing those 18-B lawyers into court against the D.A.s was like
sending an unarmed prisoner in against the gladiator. Then the
Gideon case came along. On the surface it did not change the
substantive law of New York, but it created a moral suasion and
incorporated into New York law all of the precedents in the fed-
eral courts dealing with the effective assistance of counsel. At
the same time, and within the years following, there was the
revolution in criminal justice, which you are all familiar with,
and the trial of the criminal case and the defense of it became
very complicated, much more complicated now, of course, than
it was twenty-five years ago. In addition, the caseloads have
been growing enormously.
Nevertheless, I celebrate. Those of you who have appeared
before me or are familiar with my records on appeal know that I
apply very high standards of performance on both sides of the
case. And I have no hesitation in saying that the representation
supplied to the defendant in my court by The Legal Aid Society
is superb.
The 18-B felony panel has created a homicide branch. The
homicide cases now rarely plead out. Ninety-five percent of
them go to trial. And, again, the general quality of representa-
tion is excellent. The 18-B non-homicide felony lawyers, on the
average, are excellent. There are very big soft spots, which are
being worked on, but I am comfortable, as (I hope) a conscien-
tious judge, with the quality of representation in my court.
When representation is not acceptable there is a lot I can do
about it and a lot I do. I do not do it in front of the jury, but a
lot can be done with respect to objections that are not made,
with respect to requests to charge that are not made, things that
are glaring, or not so glaring, defects that a judge can point out
in conference to both sides, particularly to the defense, without
134 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1954).
278. N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722(a)(b) (McKinney 1965) allows for the defense of a mis-
demeanor, save but for "extraordinary circumstances."
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prejudicing the trial in front of the jury.
We now have the profusion of drug cases, which is going to
put much more pressure on all of us including the defense bar,
but in the present state of affairs, on the average, I would say
that in many cases, the gladiators who have come into my court
well armed are the defense lawyers assigned to the defendant
and the unarmed prisoners are the D.A.s. I am talking now not
about the investigative tools that are at their disposal, but the
skill and experience that they bring to very serious cases.
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol10/iss2/5
